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COMMENT
When Alternative Dispute Resolution Works:
Lessons Learned from the Bashingantahe
ALEXANDER J. BUSZKA†
I. INTRODUCTION
Societies have many ways to settle disputes and solve
legal issues, but not all conflict resolution systems are
created equal. Some systems are accused of being
inaccessible because they are too expensive to use and
confusing to navigate. Others are criticized for bias or unfair
outcomes. Participants search for methods of conflict
resolution that are the most predictable, accessible,
equitable, and effective.1 Their options are limited, however,
in view of various financial limitations, time constraints, and
ability or willingness to navigate a threatening or

† J.D. Candidate 2019, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law;
B.A. Political Science, 2015, Houghton College; Publication Editor, Buffalo Law
Review. I am grateful to Dr. Ron Oakerson, Professor of Political Science at
Houghton College, for starting me on this track of research, and for his guidance
and feedback as it developed. My thanks also go to Professor Christine P.
Bartholomew, for her helpful and insightful review of an earlier draft of this
comment, and to the members of the Buffalo Law Review, for their time and effort
revising this comment.
1. SANDRA F. JOIREMAN, WHERE THERE IS NO GOVERNMENT: ENFORCING
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN COMMON LAW AFRICA 15 (2011).
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complicated system. 2
Litigation in the formal court system does not enjoy
“unchallenged pre-eminence” in the field of conflict
resolution.3 Around the world, participants engage in various
alternatives to enforce compliance with legal or social norms.
Often, these options include self-help, peer pressure, appeals
to a community figurehead, or participation in a form of
mediation or arbitration.4
Some, such as the United States Department of Justice,
praise the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the
United States as an efficient, cheap, and effective method of
conflict resolution that saves participants months of
litigation and millions of dollars.5 However, the critics of
ADR are numerous.6 They point to the rising number of
motions to vacate arbitration awards and the increasing
judicial scrutiny of arbitration agreements as a sign of
growing dissatisfaction with ADR and how it is conducted in
the United States.7
In a way, both groups are right. ADR has a great deal of
potential to resolve conflict without lengthy proceedings,
high costs, or damaging relationships, while providing better
access for participants.8 But the exact practice of ADR varies
2. See Penny Brooker, The “Juridification” of Alternative Dispute Resolution,
28 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999); Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute
Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law? Lessons from Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L.
REV. 569, 582 (2007).
3. SIMON ROBERTS, ORDER
ANTHROPOLOGY 26–27 (1979).

AND

DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION

TO

LEGAL

4. Id.; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570. E.g., SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF
URBAN POOR 253–65 (2006).

THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF THE

5. OFFICE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2016
ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter DOJ 2016 REPORT].
6. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570.
7. See Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 65 SMU L. REV. 247, 247,
252 (2012).
8. See, e.g., Todd B. Carver & Albert A. Vondra, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Why it Doesn’t Work and Why it Does¸ HARV. BUS. REV., May-June
1994, at 120, 120–21.
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widely in its methods and application. In some ADR
programs, the process is unfair, it does not allow a sufficient
degree of public accountability, and it may not even prevent
participants from litigating in court afterwards. 9 But, with
significant variation comes a diverse selection of methods
from which designers of ADR programs can learn and
improve.
The institution of the Bashingantahe10 in Burundi offers
us these lessons.11 Like ADR in the United States,
Bashingantahe have faced claims of bias or limited
effectiveness, but the traditional functioning of the
institution and its progress towards correcting these kinds of
issues provide examples of how an ADR system can improve.
Where the Bashingantahe show effective problem solving
with transparent proceedings and public accountability, its
methods and principles can offer solutions to the weakness
of ADR. They also reaffirm practices that are already making
progress towards the goal of efficient and fair conflict
resolution in the United States.
I will first categorize the different forms of ADR and
summarize the growing prevalence of ADR in the United
States. Then I will describe some of the most commonly cited
benefits of ADR, before discussing common criticisms that
follow from mandatory ADR programs and the informal
nature of ADR. After introducing the background of the
Bashingantahe and how they function today, I will compare
how the Bashingantahe’s current ADR practices match with
their espoused principles of their institution, and how they
either improve or maintain their practices to better
represent those ideals. Finally, I will draw out how the
9. Id. at 120–23.
10. See infra Appendix: Glossary of Terms, for an explanation of Kirundi
words used in this Comment.
11. See Assumpta Naniwe-Kaburahe, The Institution of Bashingantahe in
Burundi, in TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT:
LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 149, 154 (Luc Huyse & Mark Salter eds.,
2008).
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Bashingantahe’s efforts to maintain and improve their
institution provide examples of how ADR programs in
general can increase their accessibility, equitability,
fairness, and effectiveness.
II. CATEGORIZING ADR
ADR is an umbrella term for many different forms of
dispute resolution that involve a third party to assist
discussion, mediate negotiation, or arbitrate disputes. 12 The
uniting principle is that these methods are something less
than formal litigation.13 ADR commonly refers to mediation
and arbitration, but can also include judicial settlement
conferences, fact-finding services, and private adversarial
proceedings.14 Courts also use ADR to triage cases, through
methods such as early neutral evaluation or mini-trials.15
ADR methods fall into two main categories: voluntary or
mandatory.16 Voluntary ADR is pursued by parties
independent of a court’s order,17 and includes contracts to
use ADR before, or in place of, formal litigation.18 Mandatory
ADR forms a “‘mandatory settlement’ or ‘non-trial’
adjudicatory track,” where a court requires parties pursuing

12. Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Intell. Prop. & Judicial Admin. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.
61 (1992) [hereinafter Congressional Hearing on ADR] (statement of Stuart M.
Gerson, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice); Brad Spangler,
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (June 2003),
https:/beyondintractability.org/essay/adr.
13. Iftikhar Hussian Bhat, Access to Justice: A Critical Analysis of Alternate
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in India, 2 INT’L J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. INVENTION
46, 49 (2013).
14. Id.
15. Id. ADR frequently covers civil cases including civil rights, environmental
and natural resources, and tax law. DOJ 2016 REPORT, supra note 5.
16. Diane P. Wood, Court-Annexed Arbitration: The Wrong Cure, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 421, 428.
17. Id.
18. Steven A. Weiss, ADR: A Litigator’s Perspective: Viewing the Pluses and
Minuses, Mar.-Apr. 1999 BUS. L. TODAY 30, 30 (1999).
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full adjudication to first participate in an ADR program. 19
Mandatory ADR is often called Court-Annexed Arbitration
(CAA).20
A CAA requirement is usually found in state statutes,
regulations, or court rules that establish which types of cases
must be arbitrated before continuing to formal court
litigation.21 CAA is often required for suits with money
damages below a certain amount or that do not address a
federal constitutional claim.22 CAA varies in its local
application and some forms lack many procedural
requirements compared to formal litigation.23
Binding arbitration is more similar to traditional
litigation than non-binding arbitration. Binding arbitration
is where an arbitrator decides a case on the merits after
presentation of evidence and arguments by parties.24 CAA is
non-binding, so all decisions may be reconsidered by the
court that ordered it.25 Each party may demand a trial de
novo if it is dissatisfied with the arbitration result, at which
point the case goes onto the docket and follows the
traditional litigation process.26

19. Wood, supra note 16, at 428.
20. Bhat, supra note 13, at 49.
21. John P. McIver & Susan Keilitz. Court-Annexed Arbitration: An
Introduction. 14 JUST. SYS. J. 123, 123 (1991); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 651 (2012); OR.
REV. STAT. § 36.400 (2015); 231 PA. CODE § 1301 (2006); In re Adoption of
Alternative Dispute Resolution Plan (W.D.N.Y. May 11, 2018); Standing Order,
In re Alternative Dispute Resolution Plan (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2010).
22. Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A
Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169,
2177–78 (1993).
23. Id. at 2177–81.
24. Weiss, supra note 18, at 30.
25. McIver & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 123.
26. Congressional Hearing on ADR, supra note 12, at 16 (statement of Hon.
William W. Schwarzer, Senior J., United States District Court for the Northern
District of California & Director, Federal Judicial Center).
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Mediation, the other most common form of ADR,27
usually involves a trained neutral mediator.28 Mediation can
be conducted by one or several mediators, often chosen by the
parties. In some situations, a neutral third party, such as the
state bar, may also select a mediator.29 A mediator’s role may
be strictly limited by the parties’ agreed-upon rules or by a
court. For example, a mediator may not be allowed to request
more information from a party than what is offered.30 The
parties resolve the dispute consensually through negotiation,
with the mediator attempting to facilitate discussion or
address the underlying issues of the dispute. 31 Parties may
submit written statements or documents, make
presentations, or meet individually with the mediator to
realistically assess their complaints.32
Often mediation is confidential, non-binding, and has
informal procedural rules.33 It is also different from formal
proceedings because it evaluates each case on its own
individualized terms.34
III.HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ADR IN THE
UNITED STATES
In the United States, the systems of ADR and litigation

27. Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Mediation and Social Justice:
Risks and Opportunities, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2012).
28. Congressional Hearing on ADR, supra note 12, at 31 (statement of Hon.
John Leo Wagner, Mag. J., United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma).
29. Id.
30. See Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 25–26, 26 n.82.
31. Congressional Hearing on ADR, supra note 12, at 31 (statement of Hon.
John Leo Wagner, Mag. J., United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma).
32. Brooker, supra note 2, at 9.
33. Congressional Hearing on ADR, supra note 12, at 31 (statement of Hon.
John Leo Wagner, Mag. J., United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma); Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 7.
34. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 3.
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are intertwined because mediation and arbitration are
conducted in view of pending litigation, potential litigation,
and a court’s enforcement of arbitration results.35 So while
ADR programs stand to gain from the continued operation of
the court system, ADR persists in spite of it, due to the
attractive promises of a faster, less expensive, and less
tedious process.36
In the United States, interest in ADR began to grow in
the 1970s, stemming in part from concerns of an overworked
judicial system.37 As the number of lawsuits filed in the
formal court system increased, so did complaints of longer
delays and procedural errors.38 The ADR movement centered
around the effects of prohibitively high costs to use the
formal court system.39 If an individual is unable to afford
litigation, according to the argument, he or she is effectively
no better off than if the government had actually abolished
civil courts.40
In the 1990s, commentators began to label the courts’
inability to efficiently handle the volume of criminal and civil
cases a “state of crisis.”41 In response, parties chose to solve
35. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 581–82 (describing that the formal court
system and ADR are not separate systems, but intertwined, because judges often
refer cases to arbitration, or ADR is conducted in the “shadow” of potential
litigation).
36. See Weiss, supra note 18, at 30.
37. See Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 1; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570.
38. Spangler, supra note 12.
39. Besides being costly in time and money, the adversarial system can be
inaccessible in the sense that it can be confrontational, confusing, and
threatening. Brooker, supra note 2, at 3. While an attorney has an ethical
obligation to communicate with and listen to a client, the client must still place
a heavy reliance on the attorney to manage their case for them, due to specialized
language and specific procedural requirements. See id. If a person cannot afford
an attorney, he or she must proceed without such assistance. The concern over
the confusing and costly formal court process does not belong solely to those who
cannot afford it. Corporate clients also find litigation a burden, given the time
and cost it may take to resolve a case. Weiss, supra note 18, at 30.
40. Wood, supra note 16, at 425.
41. Id. at 421–22.
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their disputes outside of the courtroom.42 They increasingly
took advantage of alternatives such as expert mediators,
rent-a-judge programs, informal mediation, and grassrootslevel dispute resolution.43 Between 1983 and 1988, the
number of providers offering ADR services increased
tenfold.44
The movement received positive media attention and
government support as a solution to delays, expensive
proceedings, and overcrowded dockets.45 President Clinton
encouraged ADR growth by calling for federal agencies to
develop ADR programs to make the government operate “in
a more efficient and effective manner” and to encourage
“consensual resolution of disputes.”46
In response to favorable reviews of ADR, Congress
authorized courts to engage in ADR.47 As its popularity
increased, ADR’s principles and methods were embedded
into the formal court system and private institutions.48 Amid
some dissentions, many states and federal district courts
joined the federal government in encouraging or mandating
the use of arbitration programs.49

42. See Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2172.
43. See id. at 2172, 2187.
44. Id. at 2187.
45. Id. at 2172.
46. Memorandum on Agency Use of Alternate Means of Dispute Resolution
and Negotiated Rulemaking, 1 PUB. PAPERS 663 (May 1, 1998).
47. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–58 (2012); see Congressional Hearing on ADR, supra note
12, at 6–7 (statement of Hon. Thomas J. Moyer, C.J., Supreme Court of Ohio).
48. Sandra Kaufman et al., Should They Listen to Us?: Seeking a
Negotiation/Conflict Resolution Contribution to Practice in Intractable Conflicts,
2017 J. DISP. RESOL. 73, 75–76. Kaufman described the process of the adoption of
ADR into the courts, government agencies, community organizations, and the
workplace as a function of researchers promoting negotiation in dispute
resolution practices throughout the twentieth century. The increasing
commonality of phrases like “collaborative decision making” and “consensus
building” in the workplace, and federal agencies adopting “negotiation-based
conflict management practices” like mediation are examples of this. Id.
49. Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR: Where Have The Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA
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While formal systems, such as litigation, offer greater
degrees of certainty and transparency, they can also be
slower and costlier, and may not properly consider
individualized circumstances.50 One litigator described some
considerations when choosing ADR or the formal court
system:
On the plus side, it usually allows for a faster, less expensive
resolution, and therefore a more satisfied client. On the minus side,
ADR does not always allow a lawyer to delve deeply enough into the
evidence, and in the case of nonbinding arbitration or mediation,
can sometimes lead to a more expensive and slower resolution.51

IV. ADR
A. Benefits of ADR
The proponents of ADR argue it helps to increase access
to dispute resolution, preserve relationships among parties,
increases efficiency, takes advantage of informality, and
preserves consent in the process.
1. Access
Access to a dispute resolution system is critical to its
success and legitimacy, and is a driving force behind the
growth of ADR as an alternative to formal litigation. 52
Internationally, the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) recognizes ADR as especially useful
in countries where the judiciary has become untrustworthy
or lost respect in the eyes of the citizens.53 But descriptions
of courts with delays, high costs, and technical proceedings
are as applicable domestically as they are abroad, and

L. REV. 1055, 1055–56 (1996).
50. Weiss, supra note 18, at 30.
51. Id.
52. See JOIREMAN, supra note 1, at 17.
53. SCOTT BROWN ET AL., USAID CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTITIONERS’ GUIDE 7 (1998),
https://gsdrc.org/docs/open/ssaj1.pdf.
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economic barriers prevent many from accessing justice.54 In
this respect, ADR offers a way to access a method of conflict
resolution for those who cannot or will not use the court
system.55
ADR can decrease the cost for parties to engage in
dispute resolution and can be cheaper than a formal court
proceeding.56 ADR is credited with taking less time to resolve
a dispute and it may provide an alternative to a court system
that some view as corrupt or biased.57 When ADR is
organized and performed at the grassroots level, the shorter
distance that parties are required to travel means a lighter
demand on time and work.58 ADR’s procedures can be
streamlined by agreement, allowing participation for those
who cannot otherwise afford the time and expense of “fullblown litigation.”59 Increased access to ADR benefits courts,
which save administratively by dealing with fewer disputes,
and benefits those who are normally excluded from the
justice system.60
2. Preserving Relationships
ADR can help preserve or improve business or personal
relationships through a conflict.61 Instead of having a winner
and loser, both parties may come away from the negotiation
more satisfied.62 The ability for parties to address each other
54. See id.; Wood, supra note 16, at 452–53.
55. BROWN ET AL., supra note 53, at 7.
56. Bhat, supra note 13, at 49; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 575–76; see Raquel
Aldana & Leticia M. Saucedo, The Illusion of Transformative Conflict Resolution:
Mediating Domestic Violence in Nicaragua, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1261, 1311 (2008).
57. Aldana & Saucedo, supra note 56, at 1309, 1311; Bhat, supra note 13, at
49; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 575–76, 580.
58. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 575–76; see, e.g., Aldana & Saucedo, supra
note 56, at 1309.
59. Weiss, supra note 18, at 30, 33.
60. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 1.
61. Carver & Vondra, supra note 8, at 120–21.
62. BROWN ET AL., supra note 53, at 7.
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neutrally, engage in fact-finding, negotiate over a solution,
and focus on reconciliation gives ADR an advantage over
formal litigation.63 The “win-win” advantage also gives ADR
relevance to disputes between businesses or issues that
parties would normally address in family court.64
3. Efficiency
Another benefit of ADR is its use to avoid delays and
docket congestion.65 This, along with streamlined
procedures, enables ADR to resolve disputes faster than
formal litigation.66 With ADR, parties may be able to select
someone with specialized knowledge of their specific case or
the general subject matter, reducing the time it takes to
explain issues to a judge or jury.67 Because parties can
directly participate in outlining the process they wish to use,
ADR can avoid lengthy proceedings, technicalities, and
discovery abuse.68
4. Informality
The informality of ADR is both a benefit and a criticism.
Some see informality as a method of achieving
confidentiality in situations where a person or corporation
would like to protect its reputation, while others criticize it
as a secret proceeding.69 It also allows for an individualized
result of the proceeding, according to the parties’ own

63. Aldana & Saucedo, supra note 56, at 1311; Sternlight, supra note 2, at
580.
64. Kaufman et al., supra note 48, at 73; Spangler, supra note 12.
65. Bhat, supra note 13, at 49; Weiss, supra note 18, at 33; see generally
Carver & Vondra, supra note 8.
66. Bhat, supra note 13, at 49; Weiss, supra note 18, at 33.
67. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2239; Weiss, supra note 18, at 32.
68. Spangler, supra note 12; Weiss, supra note 18, at 33; Wood, supra note 16,
at 452–53.
69. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2239–40; Brooker, supra note 2, at 5;
Spangler, supra note 12; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570, 587.
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relevant social or industry norms.70
Informality gives mediators and arbitrators the
flexibility to address the uniqueness of each case, which
would otherwise defeat useful generalizations in the formal
court system.71 It allows for creating solutions that are
tailored to the parties’ precise situation and allows the
ability to address unique features of a problem.72 The
flexibility of ADR’s “individualized justice” is unavailable in
the formal legal system and it allows “room for mercy in an
otherwise rigid, rule-bound justice system.”73
5. Consent
Some forms of ADR are voluntary and require the
consent of the parties to participate. This is an advantage
because it can signal a willingness to cooperate and comprise
to the other party.74 Voluntarily agreeing to participate in
mediation or accept an arbitration result can improve
compliance with an agreement because each party felt it
contributed to developing the rules and procedures that
governed the process.75 Requiring consent to participate also
allows groups which are disadvantaged to engage in forum
shopping for a less biased mediator or adjudicator and places
an incentive on mediators and adjudicators to promote a
solution that satisfies both parties.
An effective ADR program is one that promotes access,
preservation of relationships, efficiency, informality, and
consent, while minimizing the costs associated with its use.

70. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 583–84.
71. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 4–5; see Kaufman, supra note 48, at 75.
72. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 4–5.
73. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons
from Equity Jurisprudence and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57,
58–59 (2004).
74. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2243.
75. Spangler, supra note 12.

2019]

WHEN ADR WORKS

177

B. Criticism of ADR
ADR is no panacea, however, and there are plenty of
situations where ADR has not produced its touted benefits.
In some cases, it decreases efficiency. One example is when
two companies let their “litigious habits worm their way into
the process.”76 They went to arbitration before litigation due
to a clause in their contract, and arbitration that should have
taken six to twelve weeks “ballooned into a five-year
marathon, with five to six hours of testimony four or five days
every single week.”77 The judge also played a role—he
started to subpoena evidence against custom. Lawyers began
taking depositions, and the arbitration ended in an appeal to
the court to overturn the arbitrator’s decision.78
This example demonstrates one category of complaints
lodged against ADR and specifically CAA: it merely adds
another layer of litigation to the court system. A second
category of complaints against ADR is its private and
informal nature, which some argue is hostile to the rule of
law and detrimental to achieving justice.
1. Criticism of Mandatory ADR: CAA
Commentators criticize that CAA is not very different in
substance from litigation, particularly when parties and
arbitrators act as if they were in court.79 The concern is the
more litigious arbitration becomes, the more it reduces
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Despite this criticism,
courts often mandate CAA.80 About 65% of cases facilitated
by the American Arbitration Association are CAA.81
CAA often effectively adds another layer of litigation to

76. Carver & Vondra, supra note 8, at 121.
77. Id. at 122.
78. Id. at 122–23.
79. Id. at 123.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 124.
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the court system when parties include “excess baggage” to
arbitration.82 Excess baggage can appear in the form of extra
motions, briefs, discovery, depositions, and expert
witnesses.83 Lawyers in litigious arbitration make repetitive
recitations of facts and legal arguments, cater positive
publicity for their case, and act with the hostility of a
lawsuit.84 Arbitrators may make arbitration more litigious
by acting like judges or awarding damages that are beyond
contractual limits.85
Appealing arbitration awards increases costs because
the parties might as well have gone directly to court. If
parties treated CAA as a platform to litigate, then they must
restart just to re-litigate the same arguments on appeal.
Arbitration is then merely a pretrial expenditure.86 CAA also
raises the cost of an arbitration appeal by reviewing de novo
and awarding post-arbitration fees and cost-shifting.87 This
is where, by statute, a party must pay the cost of the
arbitrator’s fee if the result of the de novo trial is not more
favorable than the arbitration award.88 The extra time spent
in litigation is all the more futile where a party only lost
arbitration due to the admission of evidence which would not
be admitted at trail.89 Given the potential for an appeal and
the greater “maximum out-of-pocket loss” a party might bear
to request one, CAA discourages risk-adverse or poorer
litigants who may otherwise bring a suit.90
The non-binding nature of CAA solidifies its reputation
as an additional layer to the court system. If a party appeals
82. Id. at 120.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 123.
85. Id.
86. Wood, supra note 16, at 449.
87. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2235.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 655 (1988); Wood, supra note 16, at 449.
89. Wood, supra note 16, at 449–50.
90. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2231, 2235.
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an arbitration decision, it can use the information and
arguments it heard and made to put itself in a stronger
position to pursue litigation after arbitration.91 Given the
increasing procedural formality of ADR, parties may use
CAA’s procedures to delay the settlement of a dispute, then
refuse to accept the arbitration award, as a tool to draw out
litigation. This effectively reduces CAA to a tool lawyers may
manipulate for negotiation.92
CAA’s increasing cost, combined with the likelihood of
continued litigation, has led to a perception that CAA
interferes with parties’ right to trial and forces them into
receiving “second-class justice.”93 The end result is the cost
of ADR and litigation become very similar, which prevents
access to dispute resolution.94 To this effect, several
companies see increased damage awards, legal billings, and
delays after using CAA.95
2. Criticism of Private and Informal ADR
Criticism of the private and informal nature of ADR
generally falls into one of three categories: concerns about
the inability of mediation to achieve social justice; lack of
public accountability; or the quality and ethical control over
mediators.
a. Social Justice Concerns
The informal and private nature of ADR raises criticism
that it does not effectively achieve social justice, especially
when cases are handled individually, each on its own terms,

91. See id. at 2227–28.
92. Brooker, supra note 2, at 14, 23, 25.
93. Congressional Hearing on ADR, supra note 12, at 20–21 (statement of
Hon. William W. Schwarzer, Senior J., United States District Court for the
Northern District of California & Director, Federal Judicial Center); Spangler,
supra note 12.
94. Brooker, supra note 2, at 23; Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2253.
95. Carver & Vondra, supra note 8, at 120.
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in the absence of formal rules, and with less scrutiny.96 If
ADR cannot achieve social justice, then ADR effectively
sacrifices social justice to save administrative costs, which
one author calls “an invidious policy that should be
rejected.”97
One facet of this issue arises when certain cases are
categorically channeled into arbitration or mediation and
parties are of significantly different power and status. 98
When a member from a disadvantaged group is forced to
negotiate in mediation, the rules applied may not promote
equality, and parties’ rights may be “nickeled-and-dimed”
away without their consent, for the sake of compromise. 99
Mediators could intentionally or unintentionally steer
parties into agreements that are unfair to them, given a
mediator’s potential lack of information on the subject
matter or lack of knowledge of a power imbalance between
parties.100
Even where mediators and arbitrators are striving to be
fair, the “real world demand of client expectations”
encourages them to pressure settlement to save time and
money.101 Privileging “settlement per se” in this way, without
sufficient attention to the quality of settlement, may
disadvantage a certain party when a power disparity
hampers its negotiating ability. 102
In this respect, the private and individualized nature of
ADR presents a risk of failing to protect weaker parties with
unequal bargaining power.103 According to one author, the
96. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 3.
97. Id. at 34.
98. Id. at 5.
99. Id. at 6 (quoting Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88
YALE L.J. 998, 1012–15 (1979)).
100. Id. at 8, 28.
101. Id. at 24–25.
102. Id.
103. Yamamoto, supra note 49, at 1059 (citing Owen M. Fiss, Against
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risk of a party, mediator, or arbitrator acting on prejudices is
greatest in situations where there is a great power disparity
and few rules governing the negotiation.104 In contrast,
parties may be more hesitant to act upon prejudices where
the formality of a court proceeding serves to remind them of
“the American values of equality and fairness.”105 In these
situations, the formality and publicity of litigation, instead
of being a target for criticism, offers some protection for
vulnerable groups who would otherwise be at risk for biased
treatment.106
Private ADR raises concerns about “micro-justice.” In
this conception of social justice, “micro-level” justice is that
which is aimed at the individual level.107 Macro-level justice,
on the other hand, means “equality between groups,” “justice
at the aggregate level,” and the cumulative effect of microlevel justice.108 If injustices are recurrent, systematic, and
consistently addressed at the micro-level, then all these
individual cases add up to make changes at the macro-level
to contribute to social justice.109
The brunt of the criticism here is that because a private
arbitration or mediation decision is not precedent, it
disaggregates claims of collective injustice, which might
otherwise succeed under legal doctrines of the formal court
system.110 This claim has a historical basis, as mediation
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984)).
104. Id. (citing Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1388–
99).
105. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570–71, 571 n.9 (citing Richard Delgado,
Alternative Dispute Resolution Conflict as Pathology: An Essay for Trina Grillo,
81 MINN. L. REV. 1391, 1398 (1997)).
106. Yamamoto, supra note 49, at 1059.
107. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 4.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 12; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570, 570 n.4 (citing David Luban,
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622–23
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during the Civil Rights era “led enforcement agencies to
overlook patterns and systems of discrimination,” poorly
serving the larger goal of social justice.111 Without public
records or public hearings, it would be difficult to ensure
mediation or arbitration complies with or contributes to the
protection of individual rights.112
b. Public Accountability Concerns
ADR systems are criticized for their unaccountability to
the public. This stems from a lack of an “organic connection”
to the communities in which they operate, at least in
comparison to courts.113 ADR’s lack of accountability and
informal nature has led some to criticize it as hostile to the
rule of law.114
There is also a concern that mediators and arbitrators
are selected by individual parties, and not the general public.
To the extent the procedures allow, the privately selected
mediator or arbitrator applies rules, statutes, and interprets
public values. Some argue that a public official should be
interpreting and applying any public law or values.115 Public
participation in the democratic process, after all, gives the
public official the legitimacy to make these kinds of moral
and legal decisions that a privately selected person does not
have. Even where there is very little direct public
participation in the selection of a federal judge, at least the
(1995) (noting that private adjudications fail to produce rules or binding
precedents)).
111. Yamamoto, supra note 49, at 1059–60 (citing Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses
and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 482, 540–46 (1987)).
112. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570.
113. Joseph A. Scimecca, Conflict Resolution and a Critique of “Alternative
Dispute Resolution,” in CRIMINOLOGY AS PEACEMAKING, 263–79 (Harold E.
Pepinsky & Richard Quinney eds. 1991).
114. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984); see
Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570, 570 n.4. (citing Harry T. Edwards, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 675–82 (1986)).
115. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570 n.4.
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public has some opportunity to exert indirect control over the
appointment. In the decision of who to hire as a mediator or
arbitrator, however, the public has none.
The private records created by ADR, or the lack thereof,
are not subjected to public scrutiny like court documents.
This removes another opportunity for the public to exert
some form of control over the result, or at least future results
of similar cases.116 Perhaps for this reason, many courts bar
ADR from handling constitutional claims.117
The issue of ADR disaggregating claims of collective
injustice again becomes relevant. But here, the consideration
is that the lack of public accountability makes information
private that should be public.118 This private information
could have been used by the public in similar, small stakes
civil suits.119 Depending on the use of ADR, disaggregating
claims can avoid collective litigation which would otherwise
serve as a method of group mobilization and political

116. Spangler, supra note 12. Public knowledge of a case result can affect
future, similar cases through its precedential value, encouraging legislation, or
garnering public support for or against the decision. Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) is referenced as an example of the kinds of public
benefits that would be lost through the disaggregation of claims, if such a case
was never public and courts were never able to use it as precedent. Bush &
Folger, supra note 27, at 5; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 578. It is noted that civil
rights cases are often a category of claims that are excepted from mandatory
CAA, to prevent exactly this situation. However, the concern with some authors
remains that channeling claims into ADR deprives that claim of having any
potential precedential effect, which in these situations would greatly benefit the
public at large. See Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570.
117. See Congressional Hearing on ADR, supra note 12, at 10 (statement of
Hon. Thomas J. Moyer, C.J., Supreme Court of Ohio). In some cases, the public
interest may override the desire to go through mediation or arbitration.
Sternlight, supra note 2, at 572 (“In the United States, even many of ADR’s
staunchest advocates recognize that there are circumstances in which disputes
are better resolved publicly, through litigation, rather than through negotiation,
mediation, arbitration, or some other private means.”). One example is a dispute
in which a constitutional right is implicated. See Bernstein, supra note 22, at
2177–78. These kinds of claims are likely best left to the formal court system.
118. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570.
119. Wood, supra note 16, at 451.
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c. Quality and Ethical Concerns
Some point out there are few mechanisms or incentives
in place to ensure ADR mediators are good quality.121 For
example, if compensation for mediators is too low, service in
dispute resolution will compete with other forms of pro bono
activity, detracting from the pool of qualitied mediators. 122
Mediation especially relies on the mediator’s skill in
suggesting alternative solutions, establishing trust, and
assessing the interests of each party.123 If the quality of ADR
mediators and arbitrators is poor, the entire mediation effort
might fail.124
One solution to this problem could be to professionalize
the arbitrator or mediator corps, outside of the services
offered by judges as part of local court ADR programs.
Although requiring ethical standards or competency tests
can produce some benefits,125 the corps should not become so
formalized by the state that they lose the flexibility they need
to adequately respond to parties’ problems.126 Formalization
would mirror the disadvantages flowing from CAA:
procedural protections are removed for the sake of efficiency,
but the ADR program is not sufficiently informal to confer
the benefits of informalism, such as an individualized,
tailored decision.127
If there is limited oversight of mediators and arbitrators,

120. See Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570.
121. Wood, supra note 16, at 447–48.
122. Id.
123. Weiss, supra note 18, at 32.
124. See id.
125. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 14.
126. One of the primary concerns with a professional arbitrator corps is that it
would become so regulated or formalized that it would essentially function like a
“lower tier” of courts, not unlike CAA. Wood, supra note 16, at 447–48.
127. Id.
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other quality and ethical issues may be at stake. If parties
reduce discovery, like limiting a mediator or arbitrator’s
ability to request more information, a decision may be based
on an incomplete view of the facts.128 A decision based on
partial information or the inability to discover that a party is
concealing information, may result in a settlement that lacks
substantive fairness.129
Mediators and arbitrators are susceptible to the same
temptations of corruption as judges and a biased mediator
could have a significant impact on the ultimate negotiation
result.130 The difference is that many ADR proceedings are
conducted in private, whereas the publicity of a judge’s
decision and proceedings can act as a check on his or her
actions.131 Although parties may accept certain ethical risks
as tradeoff for speed and costs, this risk may be justified by
a degree of trust or experience with the mediator. 132
3. Squaring the Benefits of ADR with the Criticisms
In devising a solution to the problems of formal
litigation, one cannot just combine the formal and informal
dispute resolution systems, because their values can be
mutually exclusive.133 ADR programs begin to lose the
benefits of informalism when the procedures begin to become
more repetitive, burdensome, and similar to “litigation-indisguise.”134 The result is that like litigation, the costs of
ADR rise, but without procedural protections or public

128. Weiss, supra note 18, at 33.
129. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 26.
130. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 587.
131. Id.
132. Pryor, supra note 7, at 258.
133. The end result of such a combination is a program like CAA. Wood, supra
note 16, at 455–56.
134. Carver & Vondra, supra note 8, at 123. Or what Carver and Vondra, call
“let[ting] old litigious habits worm their way into the process.” Id. at 121.
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oversight.135 These parties will witness the worst of what
both ADR and litigation have to offer, without the any of the
benefits. They “might as well go back to court.”136
To maximize the benefits of informalism, while
minimizing the costs, the goal should be to design a system
of ADR that is democratic and publically accountable. It
should be less adversarial and more conciliatory, but not
secret. ADR can have formal recognition, but the government
should not exercise recognition as a tool to centralize or coopt control of the mediators or arbitrators.
The institution of the Bashingantahe in Burundi shows
how to design such a system. The institution can
demonstrate a way to maximize access to ADR, preserve
relationships, increase efficiency, and take advantage of
informality and consent. While the Bashingantahe have
faced criticism for the practices of their institution, their
efforts to improve, show how an ADR program might better
contribute to social justice, maintain public accountability,
and encourage quality and ethical mediators and arbitrators.
V. BASHINGANTAHE
A. The Institution of the Bashingantahe
Bashingantahe are the group of individuals who are
invested with the responsibility of settling conflicts at the
village level in Burundi.137 They act as local peacemakers,
performing the roles of mediators and arbitrators.138 The

135. Id. at 123.
136. Id. at 121.
137. The word Bashingantahe comes from the Kirundi word gushinga,
meaning to plant down, and the word intahe, referring to a traditional staff of
justice. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 154. Together, it means “the one who
bolts down the law,” but is figuratively understood to be a person who is qualified
to provide advice and administer justice and equity. Id.
138. Mutoy Mubiala, The Contribution of African Human Rights Traditions
and Norms to United Nations Human Rights Law, 4 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL
DISCOURSE 210, 230 (2010).

2019]

WHEN ADR WORKS

187

Bashingantahe have a moral and social responsibility to
their communities and have historically been “the guardians
of tradition and of good behaviour.”139 The institution’s
legitimacy derives from a community’s investiture of these
individuals as Bashingantahe and the Bashingantahe’s
moral contract with that community.140 In 2010, an
estimated 134,000 Bashingantahe operated in Burundi.141
The institution functions differently from community to
community, but Bashingantahe generally settle disputes by
convening a council or panel of Bashingantahe at their
colline, hearing a case, and offering a solution.142
B. History of the Bashingantahe
1. Bashingantahe as Traditional Advisors
Traditionally, Bashingantahe were men selected by local
villagers for the quality of being morally and socially
responsible.143 The bundle of qualities that make up an ideal

139. NIGEL WATT, BURUNDI: BIOGRAPHY
(2008).

OF A
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140. Patrick B. Litanga, Indigenous Legal Traditions in Transitional Justice
Processes: Examining the Gacaca in Rwanda and the Bashingantahe in Burundi
47 (Oct. 5, 2014) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Ohio University) (on file with
OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center).
141. ERIC SCHEYE, NETHERLANDS INST. OF INT’L RELATIONS CLINGENDAEL,
LOCAL JUSTICE AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENT IN BURUNDI: WORKPLACE
ASSOCIATIONS AS A PATHWAY AHEAD 17 (2011). Although other sources also cite
the 134,000 number, a survey taken on by the United Nations Development
Program, completed by 2002, identified 30,411 “traditionally” invested
Bashingantahe. Bert Ingelaere & Dominik Kohlhagen, Situating Social
Imaginaries in Transitional Justice: The Bashingantahe in Burundi, 6 INT’L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 40, 45 (2012). The difference may suggest the difference
between traditional and the total number of Bashingantahe, the growth of the
institution between 2002 and 2010, inaccuracies in reporting, or a combination of
all three.
142. Colline translates literally to “hill,” but it is an administrative unit that
encompasses several hills, similar to a spread-out village or neighborhood. TRACY
DEXTER & PHILIPPE NTAHOMBAYE, HENRY DUNANT CTR. FOR HUMANITARIAN
DIALOGUE, THE ROLE OF INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN FOSTERING THE RULE OF
LAW IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS: THE CASE OF BURUNDI 6 (2005).
143. Déo Makobero, L’institution des Bashingantahe Comme Moyen de
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Mushingantahe is called bushingantahe. It is a broad
concept, but roughly means “integrity” and respect for the
common good.144 They looked over the safety of people, goods,
and the environment, resolved conflicts, and had an
administrative and educational role145 They functioned
separate from the government and so were “a precursor to
modern civil society.”146
According to legend, the institution of Bashingantahe
started in the seventeenth century.147 At that time, they
were arbitrators, representatives of their respective colline,
and advisors to the monarchy.148 The Bashingantahe formed
a hierarchy of jurisdiction throughout the country, from
resolving family conflicts in villages to settling matters at the
king’s court.149 As an independent institution, the
Bashingantahe acted as a check on government power and
abuse.150 The members of the Bashingantahe had a
“contract” or “mutual understanding” with their community,
which created an obligation to model virtuous behavior,
intervene in conflict, and protect the weak.151
2. Weakening of the Institution during Colonial and

Reconciliation, 1–2 AU CŒUR DE L’AFRIQUE 31, 31 (2001).
144. See Elizabeth A. McClintock & Térence Nahimana, Managing the Tension
between Inclusionary and Exclusionary Processes: Building Peace in Burundi, 13
INT’L NEGOTIATION 73, 86 (2008).
145. Makobero, supra note 143, at 31; McClintock & Nahimana, supra note
144, at 86.
146. McClintock & Nahimana, supra note 144, at 86.
147. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 154; Litanga, supra note 140, at 49.
148. Dolive Gretta Kwizera, The Role of the Institution of Bashingantahe in
Nurturing Good Governance and Socio-Economic Development in Burundi, 5
INT’L J. INNOVATION EDUC. & RES. 151, 152 (2017); Agnes Nindorera,
Ubushingantahe as a Base for Political Transformation in Burundi 1
(Consortium on Gender, Sec., & Human Rights, Working Paper No. 102, 2003).
149. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 156.
150. See id. at 164.
151. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 13.
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Post-Colonial Periods
Beginning with the colonization of Burundi by Belgium
in the 1920s and continuing through a series of post-colonial
military regimes, the Bashingantahe were weakened by the
state.152 This was part of a trend where the government
shifted the power of social control from the local community
to the administrative center of the country.153 The public was
distanced from the investiture process and the selection of
Bashingantahe increasingly became dependent on
government appointment, making the position more
politicized.154 Although the strength and influence of the
institution varied throughout Burundi, traditionally
invested Bashingantahe155 had continued involvement in
dispensing justice and leading reconciliation at the
community level.156

152. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 158–59.
153. Mubiala, supra note 138, at 230. For example, the Belgians began to limit
the role of customary law, and colonial authorities invalidated the
Bashingantahe’s judgments. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 43;
Kwizera, supra note 148, at 153–54.
154. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 44; Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra
note 11, at 159–60.
155. “Traditionally invested” Bashingantahe are ones that have gone through
the traditional process of investiture by the community, as opposed to political
appointees. Burundians commonly distinguish “real” Bashingantahe from the
“false” ones, drawing a line between those who were selected traditionally and
continue to follow the principles of bushingantahe, and those who were political
appointees. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 47. Burundians sometimes
qualify the title as “bashingantahe investi” for those who were traditionally
invested by the community. PETER UVIN, LIFE AFTER VIOLENCE: A PEOPLE’S STORY
OF BURUNDI 62 (2009). Burundians also distinguish the “old” Bashingantahe, who
were invested in the era of the monarchy, from the “new” ones. Ingelaere &
Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 47. In some places, the Bashingantahe are
venerated, and in others they are accused of being corrupt or ethnically and
politically biased. Id. (describing the National Council of the Bashingantahe as
“mainly dominated by urban Tutsi elites”). See MATHIJS VAN LEEUWEN, PARTNERS
IN PEACE: DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES OF CIVIL-SOCIETY PEACEBUILDING 128
(2009).
156. Sarah-Jane Koulen, Book Note, 53 J. AFR. L. 321, 323–24 (2009)
(reviewing TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT:
LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES, supra note 11).
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3. Genocide and Revitalization
Starting in 1993, Burundi experienced a period of
violence and inter-ethnic conflict.157 During the crisis,
traditionally invested Bashingantahe showed their
continued relevance through their ability to preserve peace
and resolve conflict. Facing potential assassination, they
protected victims of crime and persecution and organized
communities to arrest killers and looters.158 Bashingantahe
encouraged those who fled their homes to return, initiated
reconciliation between offenders and victims, and returned
stolen goods.159
Post-crisis, there was a renewed interest in reviving the
Bashingantahe, and the Arusha peace talks from 1998 to
2000 recognized their historical role in promoting cohesion
in the country.160 Nevertheless, after whittling down the
Bashingantahe’s prerogatives over time, government
reforms in 2005 took away their formal legal standing and
removed the force of law from their decisions.161 Where the
institution was previously centralized and incorporated as
an auxiliary to the formal court system, now it had no legal
authority whatsoever.162
Although some of the Bashingantahe face allegations of

157. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 3–4. Like in Dexter & Ntahombaye’s report,
the terms “ethnic” and “ethnic group” are used in this work with the recognition
that they “do[] not correspond to the reality of the components of the Burundian
population,” as there are still debates surrounding the origins of these groups and
whether any differences that might have existed were originally ethnic, social, or
something else. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 9 n.7.
158. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 160–61.
159. See id.
160. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 16; see generally Arusha Peace
and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, Aug. 28, 2000. For more information
on the ethnic conflict and the Arusha Peace Accords, see McClintock &
Nahimana, supra note 144, at 76–79.
161. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 12, 17; Kwizera, supra note 148, at 151.
162. Kwizera, supra note 148, at 154. One explanation for this action is the
government perceived the Bashingantahe to be a threat to its legitimacy. SCHEYE,
supra note 141, at 26–27.
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corruption and partiality, in part due to vertical integration
with the government, many continue to follow traditional
practices, especially in rural areas.163 They remain a useful
and strong conflict resolution institution, rendering
decisions and retaining their place as a symbol of justice,
despite being pushed into the realm of informality.164 They
continue to hear a wide range of cases and serve as an
attractive informal option before or instead of using the
formal court system.165 This is in part because Burundians
commonly see Bashingantahe as more accessible,
trustworthy, and legitimate than other government agents
and the formal court system. Bashingantahe are often more
independent than local administrators and have an
advantage over them, because they know the local context of
the conflicts they mediate.166
The Bashingantahe continue their role in the court
system in an informal capacity. Sometimes local courts refer
parties to Bashingantahe before hearing a case, or require
parties to submit written minutes and decisions of
Bashingantahe.167 Others use them as witnesses and experts
in cases involving property boundaries.168 Those
Bashingantahe who are invested traditionally retain their
popular legitimacy in part because of the demand for
addressing “past atrocities and injustice at the local level.”169

163. Kwizera, supra note 148, at 154–55.
164. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17; Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 159–
60, Litanga, supra note 140, at 50–51.
165. MATHIJS VAN LEEUWEN & LINDA HAARTSEN, CED-CARITAS BURUNDI,
LAND DISPUTES AND LOCAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS IN BURUNDI 9
(2005); Litanga, supra note 140, at 73.
166. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 18.
167. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17.
168. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 166.
169. Litanga, supra note 140, at 46.
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C. How Bashingantahe Function Today
Variation in the institution is significant, given the
prevalence of local control over Bashingantahe selection and
the influence of local tradition. However, some general
trends are discernable.
1. Investiture and Disinvestment
This excerpt from a transcript of a Bashingantahe
investiture ceremony introduces the idea of what is expected
of a Mushingantahe once invested:
If you pass by a place where there are conflicts, you must resolve
them. You will stand for the honor of Burundi; you will not repay in
kind to one who insult [sic.] you. . . . You will struggle for the
orphans. You will be the rest for the lonely. Be courageous in
helping the poor. It is only on this condition that God will assist you.
Be aware that you are in the place of God and the King. Combat all
laziness in your work. Be insightful during the deliberations; do not
search for richness or material interest. You will be the straight
path in which the country can trust.170

With the exception of Bashingantahe who are given the
title by government appointment, communities within local
collines invest the title and responsibilities of
Mushingantahe at their discretion. A community usually
selects individuals as candidates when they reach the age of
adolescence or alternatively, one may request to be
considered in the selection process.171
Communities then carefully observe the candidates for a
period of time, usually between three months to three years,
but possibly longer.172 The candidate is judged based on
170. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 22–24.
171. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 11–12.
172. Id.; Makobero, supra note 143, at 31–32. While there is emphasis placed
on an observation after becoming a “candidate,” a person’s actions and reputation
from before that period are considered. For example, because an individual’s
community observes and evaluates a child throughout childhood, it is more
difficult to be selected if the child “did not obey his parents, did not like to work,
preferred quarrels,” or “did not help the elderly or handicapped.” Nindorera,
supra note 148, at 19. In some areas, a seat at the Bashingantahe council can be
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certain performance measures, like the quality of his public
speaking, how well he performs certain responsibilities
during official ceremonies, and how well he debates and
resolves conflict. Although the litany of desired character
traits may vary slightly, communities also prefer candidates
with wisdom, a high regard for truth, a sense of honor and
dignity, a love of work, the ability to provide for the needs of
others, sobriety, moderation in speech and action, and a
sense of justice, fairness, the common good, and social
responsibility.173
In some collines, a candidate will need a considerable
degree of wealth as a prerequisite for selection.174 In others,
wealth is not a requirement or it may simply be preferred
that the candidate is financially self-sufficient and
independent, to resist outside influence on his decisionmaking.175 Traditionally, a Mushingantahe would be
required to have the means to provide beer for everyone in
the community at the final investment ceremony, or else
coordinate several people to share in the cost.176
A candidate is assigned a Mushingantahe as a sponsor
or mentor. The sponsor monitors the candidate’s behavior
and instructs him on the customs and skills of conflict
resolution in Bashingantahe tradition. The candidate is
allowed to observe, but not participate in, deliberations and
investigations of the Bashingantahe.
The involvement of the community and the oath a
Bashingantahe takes to follow the principles of the
institution has a function of sealing a moral contract between

inherited, or having a parent that is a Mushingantahe can give the candidate
preferential treatment. Id. at 20.
173. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 155.
174. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 16.
175. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 49; Nindorera, supra note 148,
at 20–24.
176. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12.
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the community and the new Mushingantahe.177 The oath is a
promise to follow and mediate disputes according to the core
values of the institution, called bushingantahe.178
Bushingantahe encompasses the virtues of righteousness,
socialness, wisdom, self-control, responsibility to family and
society, honor, discretion, equity, truthfulness, dignity,
courage, and moderation.179 Impartiality, fairness, and
respect for human rights and the common good are also key
components of this set.180
In practice, the application of these principles means
calming the nerves of parties while an issue is being
investigated or explaining at length the grounds for a
decision.181 The Bashingantahe apply bushingantahe to their
decision-making by emphasizing dialogue between parties,
consensus, and collegiality.182
It is key to distinguish that Burundian tradition
prescribes consultation with the people, not nomination by
the authorities.183 “Investiture is and always has been a

177. Barbara Vi Thien Ho, Post-Conflict Burundi and the Role of
Ubushingantahe Council, AFR. FAITH & JUST. NETWORK (Jul. 17, 2009),
http://afjn.org/post-conflict-burundi-and-the-role-of-ubushingantahe-council/.
178. The term bushingantahe is somewhat difficult to define, as it spans moral,
cultural, social, and legal dimensions. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at
49. Bashingantahe see themselves as not only mediators following
bushingantahe, but models of traditional and cultural values with the
responsibility to pass them on to following generations. Kwizera, supra note 148,
at 152.
179. Id.
180. Kwizera, supra note 148, at 151, 153; Litanga¸ supra note 140, at 49–50.
Bushingantahe also includes certain skills and characteristics like public
speaking, a strong work ethic, and economic independence. See Ingelaere &
Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 49; Litanga, supra note 140, at 49–50. “A sense of
humor” is even included on one list. Litanga¸ supra note 140, at 49.
181. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 140, at 141.
182. Kwizera, supra note 148, at 153. Interestingly, Burundians use the values
of bushingantahe to evaluate the quality of formal judges as well. Ingelaere &
Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 50–51.
183. According to the traditional investment process, the community is
involved in finally confirming a candidate, which functions as a contract with the
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public affair” and opposition to one’s investment, made by
any citizen, “regardless of their age or rank, can contribute
to an application for the status of Bashingantahe being
annulled.”184 Only with the community’s consent and after
taking the oath, could someone become a Mushingantahe.185
If a Mushingantahe began to act in self-interest, rather
than for the common good, or otherwise violated his oath, he
could face a temporary ban or be disinvested.186 The
Mushingantahe’s oath also acknowledges that practicing
corruption, sharing secrets, or committing other misconduct,
could result in disinvestment or banishment.187 If banished,
the Mushingantahe may be allowed to come back and rejoin
the council after a period of time and after a show of
repentance.188 Burundians continue the tradition of
investment today and Bashingantahe continue to be invested
in Burundi and abroad.189
community and a source of legitimacy for the institution. At the final investment
ceremony, the sponsor presents the candidate to the community, including the
candidate’s family and representatives of the chief. Makobero, supra note 143, at
31–32. Community members may object to investing the candidate. Id. The
investiture must be supported unanimously, and even a child’s objection is
considered. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12 n.19. Providing there
are no legitimate objections, the individual is formally invested, and the
community holds a festival. See id. at 12. Several speeches are made, including
one by a delegate of the community, who expresses agreement with the
investiture. Makobero, supra note 143, at 32. The new Mushingantahe is given
an intahe, and takes a public oath to follow the principles of the institution,
including discretion, intelligence, respect for others, and a spirit of temperance,
courage, and dedication. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12; see
Nindorera, supra note 148, at 22–23 (describing an oath-swearing ceremony).
184. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 164.
185. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 22.
186. Id. at 24.
187. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12; see Nindorera, supra note
148, at 22.
188. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 24. In case of a violation of a
Mushingantahe’s agreement with the community, “the usual sanction was to
chase him and his family from the neighborhood.” Id.
189. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 46; see, e.g., Jérôme
Bigirimana, L’Institution burundaise des Bashingantahe s’exporte en Occident,
ARIB NEWS (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.arib.info/index.php?option=com_
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2. Dispute Resolution and other Duties
The three primary missions of the Bashingantahe are
mediation,
reconciliation,
and
arbitration.190
The
Bashingantahe seek to settle disputes by reconciling the
parties or rendering a judgment, based on the nature of the
conflict. They attempt to reconcile individuals, families, and
the colline.191 The Bashingantahe also perform duties similar
to a notary, by authenticating and recording marriage, sale,
and succession of land contracts.192 They oversee
inheritances and allocate land held in trust.193 Traditionally,
they held an advisory role to politicians, acting as
kingmakers and a neutral check on the power of local
chiefs.194 Today, the Bashingantahe still maintain their
position as judicial and moral ombudsmen, separate from
and outside the government.195 Others hold political office or
an administrative position in their colline, acting as a formal
representative.196 The Bashingantahe generally oversee the
maintenance of justice, provide security for community
members’ life and property, and emphasize respect for
human rights and the common good.197
The traditional process of conflict resolution usually
begins with private mediation, followed by a public
content&task=view&id=9606.
190. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 156–157.
191. VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 155, at 127–28; Kwizera, supra note 148, at 151;
Makobero, supra note 143, at 32; Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 156.
192. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13–14; Nindorera, supra note
148, at 12; VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 155, at 127–28.
193. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 156; see Kwizera, supra note 148, at
151.
194. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 11; McClintock & Nahimana,
supra note 144, at 86; Litanga, supra note 140, at 49.
195. McClintock & Nahimana, supra note 144, at 86; Nindorera, supra, note
148, at 12.
196. In this respect, the Bashingantahe run as non-partisan candidates, and
in some areas make up 20% of the local state administrators. SCHEYE, supra note
141, at 18–19.
197. See Nindorera, supra note 148, at 14.
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hearing.198 When parties bring a conflict to the
Bashingantahe, they first seek a Mushingantahe to give
advice and attempt to mediate between the parties before
there is any hearing or decision-making.199 If the parties
cannot be reconciled, then the Mushingantahe will convene
the Bashingantahe council for arbitration.200 The
Mushingantahe who the parties first contacted about the
dispute may not sit on the council who will adjudicate the
case.201
Unlike the first reconciliation phase, the arbitration
process is public and accusatory.202 The Bashingantahe
convene a meeting of a panel, which is usually outdoors. 203
The panel typically consists of between three and five
Bashingantahe, some of whom have designated roles such as
president and secretary.204 Here, the council members
officially become judges and render a decision. The parties
first present their evidence without witnesses and the
Bashingantahe question them.205 The parties take turns
describing their version of the facts and the Bashingantahe
repeat back the facts and arguments to show they
understand the situation.206 This is meant to inspire a spirit
of reconciliation and encourage parties to have an open mind,
by making them listen to each other and hear the facts from
a third party.207

198. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12; Litanga, supra note 140,
at 49.
199. Litanga, supra note 140, at 50.
200. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 46–47; Litanga, supra note
140, at 50.
201. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17 n.52.
202. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12.
203. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 47.
204. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17 n.52.
205. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13.
206. Id. at 12.
207. Id.
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After Bashingantahe summon and interview witnesses,
the Bashingantahe enter into secret deliberations until they
reach a consensus on their decision.208 The facts of the case
and the reasoning employed by the Bashingantahe are then
explained to the parties and the attending public in
“common-sense terms.”209 After the Bashingantahe give
their decision, the party that first approached the
Bashingantahe invite the other party and the Bashingantahe
to have banana or sorghum beer, which is shared with all
people present.210 This is done in the spirit of “celebrating
and sealing the newly restored relationship” in front of the
general public.211 Aside from this requirement, there is
traditionally no fee to use the services of the
Bashingantahe.212
Compliance with the Bashingantahe’s decisions are
voluntary, as they are not binding. The Bashingantahe do
appoint a member of the community to oversee enforcement
of the decision, but they do not have any coercive power
themselves.213 They rely primarily on the wisdom and
persuasiveness of their reasoning, although community-wide
peer pressure and respect for the Bashingantahe play a role

208. Id. at 13.
209. Id. at 12.
210. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13; Ingelaere & Kohlhagen,
supra note 141, at 47.
211. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13.
212. Id. at 12.
213. Id. at 13. The Bashingantahe commonly use their influence to compel
witnesses to appear before the council, which is an expression of the same social
and moral authority they could use to encourage compliance. The use of social
influence in this way is a common feature of traditional justice systems. “In order
to restore harmony, therefore, there must be general satisfaction among the
community at large, as well as the disputants, with the procedure and the
outcome of the case. Public consensus is, moreover, necessary to ensure
enforcement of the decision through social pressure.” Traditional & Informal
Justice Systems: Traditional & Informal Justice & Peacebuilding Processes,
PEACEBUILDING
INITIATIVE,
http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/indexc
7b8.html?pageId=1876 (last updated Apr. 6, 2009) (internal citation omitted).
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in incentivizing cooperation.214
Since the revocation of the Bashingantahe’s formal legal
authority by the Burundian government, the only approval
or enforcement of Bashingantahe decisions are from local
judges on an ad hoc basis. Some judges reference the
Bashingantahe’s decisions for factual background of a case or
hear appeals of them.215 For those parties who wish for an
appeal, they may pursue their case in formal court, despite
the perception that courts are slow, expensive and corrupt. 216
Other than through these soft controls and ad hoc
affirmations by local judges, the arbitration decisions are not
binding and Bashingantahe do not have the State’s coercive
power to enforce decisions.217
Decisions are reached based on customary law, guided by
tradition and custom, which commonly places importance on
extended families and values the community over
individuals.218 The Bashingantahe usually convey their
decisions through proverbs, axioms, or other traditional
sayings, which serve as a sort of legal application of
customary law.219 There appears to be no official adoption of
precedent.220 Decisions are not always recorded, as some

214. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13. “On the whole, the verdicts
given by the Bashingantahe were accepted because they were recognized as fair
and honest.” Josephine Ntahobari & Basilissa Ndayiziga, The Role of Burundian
Women in the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts, in WOMEN AND PEACE IN AFRICA
11, 17 (UNESCO 2003). Social ostracism can be a significant behavioral control
in this respect, influencing the actions of potential offenders and aiding the
process of reintegrating those who did offend. TONY F. MARSHALL, U.K. HOME
OFFICE RESEARCH DEV. & STATISTICS DIRECTORATE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: AN
OVERVIEW 30 (1999).
215. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 17–18; SCHEYE, supra note
141, at 17.
216. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17 n.51, 17–18; VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 155,
at 128.
217. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20.
218. Id. at 13.
219. See id.; Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 47.
220. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17–18.
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Bashingantahe are illiterate, and a few Bashingantahe who
do make recordings may require the parties to offer beer
before releasing minutes of their meetings.221
D. Deviation from bushingantahe and Progress Towards
Improvement
Although
the
Bashingantahe
promote
the
bushingantahe principles of fairness, impartiality, and
integrity in their decision-making, the local practice of the
Bashingantahe varies and may not always represent the
standards of the institution. For example, although some
Bashingantahe intervened during the ethnic conflict in
Burundi, others did not condemn the violence.222 Some of the
Bashingantahe who were not selected by their communities
are seen as falling short of the principles of the institution. 223
Bashingantahe also have not historically treated all ethnic
groups or women equally. Despite these shortcomings, the
Bashingantahe have maintained and improved their
contribution towards society-wide justice and inclusion of
ethnic groups and women. The continued prevalence of the
Bashingantahe serves as evidence of the persistent effort to
make these changes and better represent the virtues of
bushingantahe.
1. Bashingantahe and Vulnerable Groups
There is some concern over vulnerable groups’ access to

221. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 21.
222. See VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 155, at 128.
223. Many Burundians have the view that the more Bashingantahe are chosen
by political authorities, instead of the traditional investiture process, the less
they are representative of the traditional values of integrity and impartiality, and
are more likely they are to be corrupt. Kwizera, supra note 148, at 151; see VAN
LEEUWEN, supra note 155, at 128. Those that are political appointees are
commonly selected based on membership in the ruling party, a diploma, or
payment of a fee. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 14; see Mubiala, supra note 138,
at 230. In the past, these appointees were commonly administrators and party
bosses, and not invested traditionally. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142,
at 14–15.
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the Bashingantahe. Primarily, the concern centers around
women and Twa, an ethnic group in Burundi who
traditionally were not part of the Bashingantahe system.224
Twa are by far the smallest minority in Burundi, and are
socially and economically marginalized due to their huntergatherer lifestyle.225 According to legend, women once sat on
Bashingantahe councils, but at some point they were
banned.226 Access to an informal option for these vulnerable
groups is especially important because they are even less
likely to use formal methods of conflict resolution. For many,
an informal conflict resolution mechanism may be their only
avenue for access to justice.227
A lack of women or Twa on a Bashingantahe council can
have a role in determining the treatment of participants that
include women or Twa.228 It may also have an effect on the
willingness of those groups to come to the Bashingantahe
with an issue, if they are prevented by fear of retaliation or
social norms governing behavior.229 Some Burundians state
Bashingantahe do not treat men and women equally, and
suggest that it is part of a larger picture of gender inequality
in Burundi, which affects all institutions, formal and
informal.230 While the Bashingantahe are making efforts to
include women and Twa in their councils, the issue of
inequality remains. One example is that some
224. Id. at 10.
225. USAID, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESOURCE GOVERNANCE: BURUNDI 5 (2010).
In Burundi, the Hutu make up roughly 85% of the population, the Tutsi roughly
14%, and the Twa roughly 1%. McClintock & Nahimana, supra note 144, at 76.
226. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 14–15.
227. Kelsey Jones-Casey, Land is Thicker than Blood or Water in Burundi:
Intra-Family Land Disputes in a ‘Post-Conflict’ State, U.S. INST. FOR PEACE: INT’L
NETWORK FOR ECON. & CONFLICT (Jun. 9, 2013, 4:55 PM) (on file with author).
228. See, e.g., Kwizera, supra note 148, at 159–60 (according to their survey of
community traditional leaders, community members, local government leaders
and national representatives in Burundi, 32.1% said the Bashingantahe do not
respect women and the youth).
229. See Jones-Casey, supra note 227.
230. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20.
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Bashingantahe do not enforce women’s right to inherit
property, even though it is sanctioned by state law. 231
Women have increasingly become more involved with
the institution.232 In some areas, wives of Bashingantahe
were traditionally invested alongside their husbands, in a
quasi-Bashingantahe status.233 This was called bapfasoni¸ a
status that recognized one’s character, but without granting
the right to deliberate or render judgment with
Bashingantahe.234 Women could also participate in a parallel
institution to the Bashingantahe, albeit limited to the female
community. Respected women could be selected and sit on a
council called Inararibonye.235 They would, like the
Bashingantahe, convene a council to hear disputes between
women, deliberate, and render a judgment or give advice to
the parties.236
Aside from the traditional facets of female involvement,
the Bashingantahe have increasingly been investing women
in their own right as full Bashingantahe since the 2000s. 237
For example, in some cases during the ethnic conflict, women
judged as Bashingantahe, while men were absent.238 As
another alternative, some villages began investing women as

231. Id.
232. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 18.
233. See DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20; SCHEYE, supra note
141, at 18.
234. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20. Although their authority
was sometimes limited to advising their husbands, women formed a necessary
part of investiture. This was because men were not considered worthy to become
Bashingantahe without being married, and the wife of a Mushingantahe was
considered as much of a role model for the community as her husband. Nindorera,
supra note 148, at 24, 26.
235. Meaning “those who have seen many things.” Ntahobari & Ndayiziga,
supra note 214, at 20.
236. Id.
237. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 18.
238. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 16.
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Bashingantahe with their husbands.239 Like their husbands,
women are given the same status, take an oath, may receive
complaints, and may intervene in conflicts.240 In some areas,
however, this is more limited and the intahe is given only to
the husband—in this situation a woman’s authority as
Bashingantahe may derive more from being a wife than
being invested individually. 241 There are also women who are
invested as Bashingantahe themselves and act in their own
capacity as a widow of a Mushingantahe.242 Burundians say
that women now regularly sit on Bashingantahe panels,
conducting public dispute resolution hearings and
deliberating with the Bashingantahe council.243
Women commonly bring their issues to Bashingantahe.
Although there is disagreement, a plurality of a group of
Bashingantahe interviewees stated that more women than
men come for adjudication or mediation.244 Commonly, girls
and adult women bring domestic violence cases and issues
they may experience as a domestic worker.245
Membership in the Bashingantahe today is open to any
individual regardless of clan or ethnicity, which is notable
and beneficial given the history of ethnicity-based conflict in
the country’s history and the perceived bias towards Hutu or
Tutsi in many formal institutions.246 Although Twa were
traditionally excluded from investiture, some have become
fully invested as Bashingantahe, with Twa Bashingantahe
present in each Burundian province.247 There is still progress
to be made, with the recognition that some Twa do not wish
239. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 18.
240. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 167.
241. Id.
242. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 18; Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 167.
243. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 18.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See Nindorera, supra note 148, at 18.
247. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 10, 10 n.14.
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to be invested as Bashingantahe, potentially due to the
strong egalitarian roots of their culture.248
2. Continued Prevalence of the Bashingantahe and
bushingantahe
Although the Bashingantahe have no legal standing,
formal courts may recommend that conflicting parties see
Bashingantahe and some will only hear cases that the
Bashingantahe could not solve.249 A Burundian court often
uses the minutes of Bashingantahe councils in its cases, uses
a Mushingantahe as a witness in a court proceeding, or asks
Bashingantahe to assist in the implementation of a ruling.250
The tribunals reaffirmed the Bashingantahe’s decisions an
average of 74.6% of the time from 1988 to 2003. 251 People
continue to bring their disputes to the Bashingantahe today,
especially for complicated land disputes.252 According to one
author, around 80% of disputes brought to the
Bashingantahe are resolved without appeal. 253 They still
play a fundamental role in social cohesion and intervene in
most family and neighborhood conflicts.254

248. Id. at 10; see JEROME LEWIS, MINORITY RIGHTS GRP. INT’L, THE BATWA
PYGMIES OF THE GREAT LAKES REGION 8 (2000).
249. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 17–18; SCHEYE, supra note
141, at 17. It seems that the Bashingantahe’s minutes and knowledge are used
to clarify the factual issues underlying the presented dispute, as well as provide
background information on the parties’ prior relationship. DEXTER &
NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 18; see SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17.
250. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 18; SCHEYE, supra note 141, at
17.
251. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 19. This corresponds with an
interviewed group’s statement that formal courts affirm the Bashingantahe’s
decision an estimated 75% to 80% of the time. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17.
252. See, e.g., Jillian Keenan, The Blood Cries Out, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 27,
2015),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/27/the-blood-cries-out-burundi-landconflict/.
253. Charles Manga Fombad, Strengthening Constitutional Order and
Upholding the Rule of Law in Central Africa: Reversing the Descent Towards
Symbolic Constitutionalism, 14 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 412, 445–46 (2014).
254. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 46–47.
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Although some Bashingantahe may act corruptly,
traditionally invested Bashingantahe are usually accorded
more trust and influence, particularly compared to other
judges or government authorities.255 The ideals of the
Bashingantahe also continue to be prevalent through many
Burundians’ ad hoc selection of their neighbors or coworkers
to mediate their disputes if they exhibit bushingantahe.256
VI. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF THE BASHINGANTAHE
The Bashingantahe show how an ADR program might
function and what benefits it might gain by adopting similar
principles and making similar improvements. The
institution’s evolution to incorporate ad hoc selection of
neighbors and coworkers who exhibit bushingantahe hints at
the wider applicability and value of Bashingantahe ideals.257
These respected individuals do not seem too far from
informal arbitration in the United States. Moreover,
Burundian complaints of a slow and expensive judicial
system seem be echoed by many in the United States.258 ADR
programs can learn from the Bashingantahe that the closer
conflict resolution institutionary are to the people in conflict,
in terms of their selection, access, and knowledge, the more
respected, utilized, and effective the institution.259
255. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 18; Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at
47; Kwizera, supra note 148, at 154–55. The government’s act of co-opting the
institution played a role in its decline in public esteem. See Ingelaere &
Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 47; Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 159. Some
Bashingantahe are described as corrupt, unprepared, or as not fulfilling their
commitments. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20–21; Ingelaere &
Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 47.
256. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 47; Litanga, supra note 140, at
72, 102.
257. See Litanga, supra note 140, at 102.
258. BROWN ET AL., supra note 53, at 3, 5–6; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 582,
586, 590; see VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 155, at 128.
259. See Litanga, supra¸ note 140, at 70, 104–06. Comparing the authority of
the Bashingantahe who are selected traditionally by their community and those
who are appointed by the state demonstrates this principle. Similar phenomena
appear in situations where the state has co-opted a local institution. A
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The Bashingantahe exemplify how ADR can increase
access to dispute resolution, preserve relationships among
parties, increase efficiency, take advantage of informality,
and use consent. They also show how an ADR system might
function to best avoid the pitfalls of CAA and minimize the
concerns about the inability of mediation to achieve social
justice, the lack of public accountability, and the quality and
ethical control over mediators.
A. The Bashingantahe and the Benefits of ADR
1. Access
The Bashingantahe are accessible to everyday
Burundians, and it remains a “natural” recourse for many. 260
This is particularly true for those who are poor, uneducated,
or marginalized.261 The cost in time and money for each party
is reduced due to the proximity of the Bashingantahe. They
are physically located at the colline in which they operate
and are available to the community within the community
itself. This lowers the distance someone might have to travel
to have a conflict solved, placing a lighter burden on time and
money.262 They have an intimate knowledge of the
background of many disputes that come before them, such as
having witnessed the contract at issue.263 This means they
comparable example is the Gacaca in Rwanda, who, like the Bashingantahe, were
a traditional institution of conflict resolution that played a role in handling ethnic
conflict. The Gacaca were less effective and respected when they became a “state
instrument” solely under state control. See id. at 56–58, 62–63. A positive
example of the value of proximity in increasing effectiveness of a method of
conflict resolution is found in Venkatesh’s description of the underground
economy of Chicago’s Southside and the clergy’s role in informal conflict
resolution between police, gangs, and the community. VENKATESH, supra note 4,
at 250–64.
260. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17–18.
261. Fombad, supra note 253, at 445–46.
262. See Bhat, supra note 13, at 49; see also BROWN ET AL., supra note 53, at 9
(explaining how ADR can better serve disadvantaged groups).
263. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20. While the Bashingantahe
often have background information on the property or issue at the center of a
dispute, it does seem that they seek to maintain a sort of de novo review of the
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require less time to become informed on the facts of the case.
This is more accessible than the formal court system in
Burundi, where resolution of a conflict can take up to ten
years, and courts often do not have the funds to travel to local
villages.264
In principle, consulting the Bashingantahe is free,
although the party bringing the case is expected to share
beer after a resolution, and there are some instances where
a Mushingantahe will require beer or a fee before hearing the
case or to release meeting minutes.265 The remedies assigned
by the Bashingantahe are more affordable than the formal
courts as well.266 The Bashingantahe are closer, cheaper, and
faster than the formal courts, which benefits parties who
otherwise would not be able to access conflict resolution. This
also benefits the courts when they use Bashingantahe or
information from their hearings in the courts’ proceedings.
2. Preserving Relationships
ADR can help preserve relationships of people and
businesses when the program is designed to encourage
parties to engage each other and discuss the problem
neutrally.267 The Bashingantahe and their traditions place a
heavy emphasis on reconciliation of parties, distinguishing it
from the adversarial mindset of litigation.268

dispute. For example, the Mushingantahe who first received the complaint recuse
themselves from the panel hearing the parties. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17
n.52.
264. BROWN ET AL., supra note 53, at 9; DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142,
at 20; SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17 n.51.
265. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12–13, 21.
266. Fombad, supra note 253, at 446.
267. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2241; Bhat, supra note 13, at 49.
268. The Bashingantahe depend on the parties’ satisfaction with the result of
the resolution and their relationship to ensure compliance with the decision. See
DEXTER & NTAHOMNBAYE, supra note 142, at 13. Reconciliation, as opposed to a
zero-sum mindset, is one of the fundamental principles of the Bashingantahe,
and parties must attempt it before any further hearing can continue. NaniweKaburahe, supra note 11, at 156–57; Litanga, supra note 140, at 50.
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Bashingantahe are selected in a way that encourages the
preservation of relationships. They are invested based on
their impartiality, fairness, and discretion, with an eye
towards how they can repair harmony in families and
villages.269 With a procedural step that attempts to preserve
a relationship, and a beer-sharing ceremony to cement that
reconciliation, the Bashingantahe show their focus on
repairing parties’ relationships.270 They have proven their
institution can do as much, having reconciled criminals and
victims during the ethnic conflict.271
3. Efficiency
The swiftness with which Burundians report the
Bashingantahe handle their conflicts, along with their

269. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 155. It could be fair to question
whether a Mushingantahe would favor one side over the other or jump to
conclusions based on personal knowledge of one’s past behavior, given that the
Bashingantahe are members of the community themselves, the use of secret
deliberations, and the fact that many Bashingantahe hearing a dispute likely
know the surrounding factual history. In the United States, we may similarly
question whether impartiality and fairness could be maintained with few
procedural safeguards, solely based on a determination of a community that a
person is generally impartial and fair, like the selection process described above.
See supra pp. 25–26. This concern betrays the differences between Burundian
and American cultural presuppositions on how to best protect impartiality and
fairness in an institution. In a discussion of concepts of “good governance,” Peter
Uvin describes how Burundians generally tend to focus less on structural
safeguards:
[T]he overwhelming majority of Burundians do not demand the Western
institutions of democracy . . . . They care far more for security and
minimal development than for elections or human rights laws. At the
same time, they deeply desire equity, respect, [and] an end to corruption.
Burundians have a language, a set of values, to describe better
governance with, and it is the language of the institution of
bashingantahe. A deep adherence to values of truth, justice, [and] nondiscrimination appeared everywhere in our conversations [with
interviewees]. While at first sight similar to Western concepts of human
rights and good governance, this bashingantahe-inspired notion of
respect is less focused on ‘right structures’ and more on ‘good people.’
UVIN, supra note 155, at 78.
270. See DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12.
271. Id. at 16; Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 160–61.
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knowledge of the situation and parties before the conflict
arises, is relevant to efficiency as much as it is to
accessibility.272 Fewer delays and faster resolution means
those who are otherwise priced out of the ADR market may
now access it.273
Even without access to coercive capabilities like the
formal courts, the Bashingantahe are successful at resolving
disputes at the local level. Bashingantahe resolve an
estimated 80% of disputes taken to them.274 This is
significant, given the Bashingantahe’s decisions are not
binding. Of the controls the Bashingantahe have over
compliance with their decisions, some may be more difficult
and contentious to replicate than others, such as a high level
of social ostracism for those who do not comply with their
decisions. Using tools such as explaining their reasoning,
compromising parties’ desires, having a high court
affirmation rate, and appointing someone to oversee
enforcement of the decision may be reasonable steps that
ensure compliance with the decision.275 Successfully resolved
conflicts mean the parties spend less resources rehashing the
same problem through a different method.
Some suggest that ADR programs should limit recitation
of the law to oral presentation without briefs to increase
efficiency.276 While some Bashingantahe hearings lack any
written record, and so practice this in effect, this option does
have the possibility of hurting the efficiency and accuracy of
an appeal.277

272. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20.
273. See Wood, supra note 16, at 449.
274. Fombad, supra note 253, at 445.
275. See DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13, 19; Naniwe-Kaburahe,
supra note 11, at 166. “On the whole, the verdicts given by the Bashingantahe
were accepted because they were recognized as fair and honest.” Ntahobari &
Ndayiziga, supra note 214, at 17.
276. See, e.g., Carver & Vondra, supra note 8, at 127.
277. See DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13
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4. Informality
Reliance on custom and tradition leads the
Bashingantahe to function informally, giving them the
flexibility to tailor solutions to a unique and complicated
problem.278 Informalism makes the main benefit of ADR
possible: “the production of mutually beneficial resolutions of
problems on the parties’ own terms.”279 It tolerates mercy
and a focus on reconciliation between the parties more than
the formal system.280
With the Bashingantahe, informality allows parties to
choose an arbitrator or mediator whom they trust and who
has specialized knowledge of their matter. 281 Traditionally,
potential parties select, with the rest of the community, the
Bashingantahe that may one day hear their dispute,
according to who they think exhibit ideal qualities for
adjudication and mediation. Although it does not seem that
parties may decide which Bashingantahe sit on the council
during their adjudication, parties may choose which
Mushingantahe they wish to approach to first mediate the
dispute.282
Parties continue to informally approach respected
individuals who exhibit bushingantahe, but are not invested
as Bashingantahe, showing how informality gives them
choice over a mediator. The lack of a strict adherence to
precedent or procedural rules and reference to custom are
what give rise to the benefits of a low cost system, which
avoids a win-lose mindset, and supports repairing of

278. See Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 4–5.
279. Id. at 7.
280. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 73, at 69.
281. The ability to informally choose an arbitrator is also present in the United
States. See, e.g., VENKATESH, supra note 4, at 250–64 (discussing using ad hoc
selection of community members for informal conflict resolution in parts of
Chicago).
282. See SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17 n.52; Litanga, supra note 140, at 50.
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relationships.283
5. Consent
Bashingantahe decisions are not binding, and there is a
lack of power of enforcement, rendering the institution
voluntary. Although this opens up their decisions to noncompliance, the Bashingantahe seem to manage this risk
through social influence, peer pressure, wisdom and
persuasiveness of reasoning, trying to meet the desires of the
parties, and appointing someone to oversee enforcement.284
The benefit of consent is that by feeling they had a role
in selecting the mediator and choosing to participate in the
process, the parties may be more likely to comply with the
decision.285 Parties exercise consent by selecting the
Mushingantahe they wish to first bring the dispute to for
reconciliation, and likely by selecting many of the
Bashingantahe who sit on the council in their colline. Given
that any member of the community can oppose the
investiture of a Mushingantahe, the consent of the wider
public to be judged by that person can be implied.
An alternative explanation is that consent to the process
does not make parties more inclined to comply, but that
parties who are more inclined to settle and comply are more
likely to choose ADR.286 In this case, the Bashingantahe are
filling a demand for voluntary arbitration. According to this
idea, requiring a party to use the institution and making the
decisions binding imposes decisions on those who are not
more inclined to negotiate and settle. The mediation would
likely be less successful if one or both of the parties do not
want to negotiate and only want to litigate. Mandating these
kinds of parties to attend mediation would use time and
resources that could be better used resolving another
283. See Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 7.
284. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13
285. Spangler, supra note 12.
286. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2243.
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conflict.287
Assuming a functioning and accessible formal court
system, an ADR program can tolerate some noncompliance,
for the sake of vindicating legal rights that are sometimes
not recognized in ADR. While the Bashingantahe have made
progress towards greater inclusion of women and Twa as full
members, there is still concern over their treatment as
parties in a dispute, given their lower social standing in
Burundian culture.288 The reliance on consent would enable
a party whose legal rights were violated in a mediation or
arbitration decision to reject the decision and claim those
rights in formal court.289 For example, a woman who has a
right to inherit property under formal Burundian law might
not be able to find Bashingantahe who would enforce it.290
Such a person could potentially seek to enforce those rights
by the formal court, assuming an accessible and functioning
formal court.
Consent plays a role in encouraging compliance, as the
Bashingantahe cannot necessarily enforce compliance.291 A
voluntary system attracts those who wish to cooperate with
the Bashingantahe’s decision. In a larger view, the reliance
on consent is also advancing the public interests of enhanced
self-determination and the parties’ respect for each other. 292
Consenting to and taking an active role in mediation with
another party can serve as “civic education” that builds a

287. See id.
288. See, e.g., DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13. This concern is
reflected in the United States, as it pertains to women and other minority
populations. See Yamamoto, supra note 49, at 1059–60. The ability of informal
ADR programs to address society-wide injustice and involvement with these
groups is discussed later in this Comment. See infra pp. 215–22.
289. See Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2243.
290. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13, 20, 39; see
supra note 155, at 128.

VAN

LEEUWEN,

291. See the discussion of the reliance on persuasiveness of reasoning and
social norms to encourage compliance, supra pp. 198–99 and accompanying notes.
292. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 36 (internal citation omitted).
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capacity for consideration and respect for other groups by
listening and responding to their case, and is a way to reverse
learned dependency on outside experts and institutions.293
B. The Bashingantahe and the Criticisms of ADR
Even if a system of ADR is democratic, in that it is
controlled by and proximate to the people who use it, some
suggest that ADR just adds another layer of litigation to the
court system. Besides, ADR is private and informal, which
can be hostile to the rule of law and detrimental to achieving
justice. Some of the actions of the Bashingantahe show how
an institution of ADR can advance the ideals of social justice,
inside and outside the context of arbitration. They show how
an ADR program might effectuate public accountability and
minimize the risks of informality, such as unqualified or
unethical mediators. One of the key aspects of the institution
is reconciliation through mediation.294 Because of this focus,
the Bashingantahe structure does not form another layer of
litigation underneath the formal judicial system—it provides
reconciliation.295
1. ‘Just Another Layer to the Court System’
Although the Bashingantahe were co-opted as an
auxiliary to the courts in the past and today local judges still
refer cases to the Bashingantahe, the service they provide is
reconciliation,
not
litigation.296
This
means
the
293. Id.
294. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12–14, 18–20;
supra note 155, at 127.

VAN

LEEUWEN,

295. See SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17. Litigation and mediation may overlap
in that they may result in the same legal outcome, but the goals are not the same.
The themes of “fairness, discretion, natural justice, and good conscience”
characterize equity and are prevalent in mediation. They are sometimes
considered “anti-legal elements” and tend to disappear from conflict resolution
mechanisms as the mechanism formalizes because they may not coincide with
statutorily created penalties or rights. Nolan-Haley, supra note 73, at 58–62; see
VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 155, at 127.
296. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17.
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Bashingantahe have a different function, and so they do not
operate as an extra layer of litigation beneath the formal
court system.
The Bashingantahe’s primary goal of reconciliation
counters the mindset of approaching ADR like a zero-sum
game.297 The Bashingantahe use a conciliatory tone and
focus on continuing the relationship between the parties,
much like a mediator between two businesses might use a
positive tone to express the benefits of continuing to do
business with each other.298
The Bashingantahe are natural and neutral expert
witnesses themselves.299 The presence of a neutral expert
witness pressures the parties to negotiate and furthers the
goal of reaching a conciliatory solution. Whereas the
presence of a partisan expert causes the parties to harden
their positions according to the testimonies of divergent
witnesses, a neutral expert takes certain facts out of
contention and prevents parties from manipulating some
facts to their benefit.300
For parties who truly want to litigate, or act like they do,
ADR will likely not be able to reconcile them. These parties
will most likely appeal the arbitration decision and proceed
onto litigation, with less time and money to spare. 301
Mediation should serve those who wish to reconcile, and the

297. A zero-sum approach to mediation increases expenses and time and
makes the mediation less likely to succeed. A possible preliminary flaw of ADR
is when “litigious habits worm their way into the process,” and the “mediation”
begins to balloon with excess motions, discovery, depositions, and witnesses.
Carver & Vondra, supra note 8, at 120–21.
298. Compare Mubiala, supra note 138, at 230 (describing how the
Bashingantahe promote a positive relationship between parties), with Carver &
Vondra, supra note 8, at 129 (describing how a mediator promotes a positive
relationship between parties).
299. See DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12; see e.g., Keenan, supra
note 252.
300. Carver & Vondra, supra note 8, at 128.
301. See, e.g., Brooker, supra note 2, at 14, 23, 25.
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structure of the Bashingantahe encourages this by being
voluntary.302
The simplified procedures, swifter process, focus on
reconciliation, and lack of a penalty for appealing a decision
to the formal court make the Bashingantahe function less
like a lower-level trial court or CAA program. Instead, it is a
separate institution that provides a separate service: equity
through mediation under its own brand of customary law.
Like those who voluntarily choose ADR, the Burundians’
continued use of the Bashingantahe demonstrate a demand
for reconciliation, around which the institution is structured
to serve.
1. Social Justice Concerns
a. Inclusion of Vulnerable Groups
One concern of ADR is that its informal and private
nature makes it ineffective at achieving social justice, in the
sense that it does not protect parties that have significantly
different power and status.303 But the changes the
Bashingantahe have made towards its treatment of
vulnerable groups show how an ADR program could make
process towards checking cultural biases and ensuring fair
decisions.
The members of the community select Mushingantahe on
the basis of their fairness, impartiality, and respect for
human rights, who then must agree to uphold those
principles.304 The arbitration is traditionally free, and so the
302. See Ntahobari & Ndayiziga, supra note 214, at 17. This is said with the
recognition that many do not have the option of pursuing formal litigation in
Burundi because of the lack of access. See SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 22.
303. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 5, 30; Laura Nader, Controlling Processes
in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-form
Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 14 (1993) (arguing that the
unwritten, informal law of mediation avoids “[d]iscussion of blame or rights,” and
is “replaced by the rhetoric of compromise and relationship,” which “thereby
obscur[es] issues of unequal social power”); Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570–71.
304. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 22; Litanga¸ supra note 140, at 49; see
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advantage and influence of money is reduced.305 Their
hearings are in public, they have an intimate knowledge of
the circumstances of the dispute, and the explanation of the
Bashingantahe’s reasoning is in common-sense terms.306 As
a result, the public has a better opportunity to recognize
manifested prejudice and may select a different
Mushingantahe to approach with a conflict or could run the
biased Mushingantahe out of the village for an egregious
violation of the oath.
Although some Bashingantahe are accused of partiality,
the Bashingantahe’s procedures and involvement of Twa and
women show a degree of public control over the informal
hearings. They also show the responsibility the
Bashingantahe feel towards the community and their
resulting efforts to remain fair. As the Bashingantahe take
steps to remain proximate in their selection process, explain
decisions, and better involve vulnerable groups, the public
can better check bias.307
b. Micro- and Macrosocial Justice
The Bashingantahe show how an ADR program might be
structured to better produce “macro-level” changes to social

Kwizera, supra note 148, at 152.
305. See Bhat, supra note 13, at 49.
306. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12. Although the hearings are
public, the Bashingantahe deliberations are in secret. Id. at 13. In spite of the
secret deliberations, however, Burundians view multi-person panels as more
trustworthy than a single decision-maker like a judge in the court system. See
Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 51.
307. This is said with the recognition that if the entire public is biased, then
they likely will not be a check on similarly biased mediators. Social-wide norms
then may not be the sole fault of the arbiter or mediators, and so the solution
would be to change the norms of the public as much as it would be to change the
norms of the ADR system. Still, the continued inclusion of women and Twa in the
institution will likely aid in checking bias in decision-making. It may be one of
the reasons why surveyed Burundians felt that Bashingantahe made their
decisions without regard to sex, wealth, age, physical condition, ethnicity or
political membership. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20.
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justice.308
Both the community and the Bashingantahe have
methods to change or develop the principles by which the
Bashingantahe arbitrate. At Bashingantahe hearings,
villagers may come to listen and give an opinion.309 Also, the
villagers exercise some localized control over investment and
disinvestment of the mediators. The community can use
their involvement as a lever to effectuate changes at the
macro-level. The Bashingantahe can also choose to make
decisions to advance the equality of parties, or otherwise
contribute to social justice. The Bashingantahe have adapted
their traditions and customs to advance social justice
through their growing inclusion of women and Twa. The
Bashingantahe can also interpret and apply the principles of
bushingantahe to promote macro-justice, similar to a system
of judge-made law.310 When the Bashingantahe are
“speaking the law” in arbitration, they can modify customary
law “in the service of social evolution.”311
Moreover, macro-level social justice can be achieved
through the many actions that produce policy change, such
as “legislative enactments, changes in legal doctrine, or
shifts in political power.”312 The Bashingantahe have a
history of working outside the sphere of mediation to support
justice at the macro-level.313 They have acted as
308. See generally Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 3–4 (explaining how ADR
can produce macro-level social equality by distributing micro-level justice to
individual disputes).
309. Ntahobari & Ndayiziga, supra note 214, at 17.
310. The Bashingantahe apply customary law, and make decisions based on
the values of bushingantahe. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 12. The
Bashingantahe do not follow a strict adherence to precedent, as many
Bashingantahe do not write down their decisions. This leads to the suggestion
that NGOs should provide Bashingantahe with literacy education, and train
them in preparing and storing records of their decisions. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE,
supra note 142, at 21, 48.
311. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 12 (internal citation omitted).
312. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 4.
313. See Kwizera, supra note 148, at 152.
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representatives of their colline and mobilized groups to
arrest killers and looters during ethnic violence.314 The
Bashingantahe educate the public about their rights and
teach them respect for the law.315 The National Council of
Bashingantahe makes public statements condemning sexual
violence and supporting the freedom of the press.316 The
Bashingantahe also played a nation-wide role in reconciling
offenders after the ethnic conflict.317
Local control over the Bashingantahe and their
interpretation of bushingantahe can be used to advance
social justice on a macro-level. The Bashingantahe have also
taken steps that show that arbitrators and mediators can act
outside their role and serve as community organizers and
representatives who contribute to social justice.
2. Public Accountability Concerns
The Bashingantahe are public figures and their
investment and contract with their community makes clear
their accountability to the public. The local involvement is a
source of legitimacy under which they make decisions on
moral and legal questions and interpret the public values
encompassed by bushingantahe.318 The dispute resolution
process is transparent, as the public may watch and

314. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 160–61.
315. Makobero, supra note 143, at 31, 36.
316. E.g., Déclaration du Conseil National des Bashingantahe du 17 septembre
2008, Halte au musellement de la presse, à l’insécurité et à la violence sexuelle
faite aux femmes!, 1, 3, https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/
container2143/files/DPP%20Burundi/Pouvoir%20judiciaire/Bashingantahe/Cons
NatBash_Declar170908.pdf (“Il exprime sa profonde inquiétude suite à cette
situation pour le moins inattendue dans un pays qui cherche à promouvoir la
gouvernance par le dialogue et dont la Constitution reconnaît bel et bien la liberté
de la presse et le droit d’expression de façon générale;” “[e]nfin, sur un autre plan,
le Conseil National des Bashingantahe constate que l’ampleur des viols et des
violences sexuelles exercés contre des femmes, des filles et de enfants devient de
plus en plus une calamité dans notre pays.”).
317. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 16.
318. See McClintock & Nahimana, supra note 144, at 86.
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contribute to the discussion.319 Therefore, the Bashingantahe
have a degree of democratic legitimacy to speak for the
interests of the community.320
The history of the Bashingantahe shows that with public
involvement in the process, through selection of arbitrators
or witnessing hearings, an ADR system can be designed to
maintain public accountability. Without public involvement,
a conflict resolution system stands to lose legitimacy, as it
did with those Bashingantahe who were appointed by the
government. When the institution was vertically integrated,
it became untrusted because the state co-opted control of the
Bashingantahe from the colline.321 The connection the
Bashingantahe have with their communities is the vehicle of
public accountably.
3. Quality and Ethical Concerns
ADR also raises the question of how to ensure mediators
are ethical and of good quality. Mediation often relies heavily
on the mediator’s skill for the effort to succeed.322 Even with
sufficient skill, a mediator could be misled by an incomplete
view of the facts surrounding the dispute and possibly
without the procedural tools to request more information.323
One solution is the creation of a professional arbitrator
or mediator corps, along with set ethical standards or
competency tests.324 But a requirement to use such a
professionalized corps before the ability to sue in a court
effectively creates a lower tier of courts, but without formal
procedural protections.325 The Bashingantahe function as a
319. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12.
320. See SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 1; Vi Thien Ho, supra note 177.
321. See DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 6; Kwizera, supra note
148, at 154–55.
322. Weiss, supra note 18, at 32.
323. Id. at 33.
324. Wood, supra note 16, at 448.
325. Id.
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corps of professional arbitrators and mediators, and they
have the benefit of accumulating experience and expertise
through repeated exposure to disputes and devising
solutions. However, they avoid the issues of a lower tier of
courts, because the institution is voluntary. Parties may
alternatively go through the courts or to another mediator,
such as a respected neighbor or coworker.326 Through a
mediator corps, mediators can develop general dispute
resolution experience, like how the Bashingantahe or career
judges would accumulate on-the-job expertise over time.327
It would likely be difficult to replicate the intimate
knowledge Bashingantahe have of parties’ cases and
circumstances outside the context of a small village or local
neighborhood. The information a Mushingantahe has gained
through day-to-day observation of behavior and agreements
relies heavily on face-to-face interaction with local
constituents.328 A mediator in another context may not be
able to have this level of prior face-to-face interaction with
the parties before they have a dispute. One way to address
this may be to use a group or panel in arbitration, like the
Bashingantahe. Decision-making in groups can sometimes
aid a lack of technical expertise by using “combined
expertise,” as one member of a panel may be able to inform
or compensate for another.329
But even without intimate knowledge, the arbitrator’s
knowledge of the context of the dispute will aid the quality of
the decision. There is a degree to which a mediator may be
able to understand a community’s broader context and social
values if the mediator operates in the locality and is
“organically connected” to the community, like the
Bashingantahe. At least these mediators would be more

326. Although the Bashingantahe were designated as a lower tier of courts in
the past. VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 155, at 127.
327. See Wood, supra note 16, at 447.
328. See DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20.
329. See Wood, supra note 16, at 447–48.
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likely to have a basic understanding of the values by which
the public would like the dispute to be resolved.
The community’s judgement exercised in selection and
disinvestment suffices for an effective competency test and
ethical standard in the case of the Bashingantahe. The
qualities desired for a Mushingantahe, such as credibility,
intelligence, and integrity, are made clear throughout the
observation and selection process.
Mediators and arbitrators may also be corrupt, or
develop biases against a party, and without a check on these
actions, the result of a negotiation could be skewed. 330
Corrupt Bashingantahe exist, particularly where the state
has wrested control of the selection process from the local
communities.331 Where the local community retains control,
they still take action to monitor corruption and control
violations of a Mushingantahe’s oath to be honest, impartial,
and fair through disinvestment or banishment.332
Promoting local control over local mediators and
arbitrators is not to say the state could not provide a
competency test or ethical standard as well. State
involvement or regulation should be balanced so that it does
not substitute local control over the mediators for its own
control. The experience of the Bashingantahe shows that
distancing communities from the selection process removes
a tool they have for quality control and public
accountability.333
Each colline has a role in ensuring sufficient quality of

330. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 587.
331. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 47. For example, a requirement
to provide beer upfront before Bashingantahe hear a case is like an unauthorized
fee, instead of a shared gift at the end of the ceremony. See DEXTER &
NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20, 20 n.51.
332. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12.
333. See Kwizera, supra note 148, at 151–52. Comparing the relevance of the
Bashingantahe to the Gacaca provides this principle as well. See supra note 259
and accompanying text.
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the Bashingantahe. Certain aspects of the institution, such
as using a multi-person panel and maintaining connection to
the community help to make sure the Bashingantahe are
making quality decisions. These are tools to prevent and
correct corruption and systematic unfair decisions by a
Mushingantahe.
VII.CONCLUSION
While the Bashingantahe have room for improvement,
including a need for more training, greater scrutiny of
corruption, greater involvement of vulnerable groups, and
maintaining community involvement, their methods and
principles offer potential solutions to many of the core
concerns surrounding ADR.334 As ADR programs struggle
with striking a balance between formalism and informalism,
many mix the two doctrines and end up with a program that
suffers from the problems of formalism while achieving none
of the benefits of informalism.335 Adherence to some degree
of informalism may be necessary for an ADR program to
effectively deliver on the promised benefits of increased
access, preservation of relationships, greater efficiency,
informality, and consent.
The example of the Bashingantahe can serve as advice
on how to best avoid the pitfalls of ADR, by promoting social
justice, increasing public accountability, and ensuring
mediators are qualified and held to ethical standards. The
Bashingantahe’s answer is a system designed to be
proximate to the community it serves, meaning that its
flexible, informal nature can be used and adapted by the
community to meet their needs. An ADR system with public
selection of mediators or arbitrators, easier access, and
mediators or arbitrators with more knowledge or
understanding of the community results in a more respected,
334. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 7–8.
335. See generally Wood, supra note 16, at 453–56 (explaining how efforts to
balance informalism with formalism can hurt the ADR process).

2019]

WHEN ADR WORKS

223

utilized, and effective institution.
In practice, this means ADR programs need to have a
corps of mediators or arbitrators who are selected and
evaluated by the communities they serve. This gives the
community the ability to select those who have a certain
degree of expertise or quality, or who match their values.
ADR would not be a lower tier of the court system, acting as
an additional forum for litigation, but could instead provide
a different kind of public good or service, such as
reconciliation of parties. Because the mediators and
arbitrators are qualified to represent the voice of the
community, they can expand their role outside of conflict
resolution, and contribute to macro-level social justice as
community organizers and mobilizers.
Increased local public involvement in selection and the
process of ADR can be a check on bias and prejudice in an
otherwise informal setting. ADR programs could also
accomplish this by increasing the inclusion of vulnerable
groups as mediators and arbitrators and use multi-member
panels for adjudication. A multi-member panel also could
have the benefit of increasing quality of the decisions and
preventing opportunity for corruption.
If the arbitrators and mediators have an organic
connection to the community, they are more likely to have
better knowledge of the circumstances of the parties and
their dispute, or at least the broader context of the
community. This equates to more accurate decisions and
more satisfied parties, meaning a greater chance of
voluntary compliance. If the arbitrators are locally based,
that also means cheaper and easier access for the parties who
have a dispute.
An ADR program of this style should also be voluntary
and non-binding. In a voluntary and non-binding program,
parties are not channeled into a system that lacks procedural
protections and infringes on their legal rights without their
consent. It gives the parties an ability for recourse, and
incentivizes the mediators to try to find common ground and
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be effective if they wish to be utilized.
The methods and principles of the institution, centered
around preserving democratic legitimacy through proximity
to the public, give parties access to a way of resolving
conflicts without lengthy proceedings, high costs, and
destroying relationships. The Bashingantahe show this can
be achieved with a sufficient degree of public accountability
to ensure fairness and quality in their judgements. Parties
must choose which forum they want to solve a dispute and in
some cases a formal court may be the best answer. But when
parties select ADR, the program should take the ideas of the
Bashingantahe into consideration so it can better provide an
efficient and fair solution.
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APPENDIX: GLOSSARY OF TERMS336
Term

Definition
The status traditionally given to a
Bapfasoni wife of a Mushingantahe; related to
ubufasoni.

than one of such a person
Bashingantahe More
(plural).
Bashingantahe The traditional council made up of
council Bashingantahe.
Pronounced ubu shing’ ga ta’ he. The
set of virtues that include justice,
Bushingantahe honesty, self-esteem, and an ethic of
hard work. Roughly summed up as
“integrity.”
“Hill” in French, but it is an
administrative
unit
that
Colline encompasses several hills, similar to
a spread-out village or neighborhood.
“Those who have seen many things.”
Inararibonye Traditionally, the council of women
that settled conflicts among women.
of justice,” symbolizing the
Intahe “Stick
authority of a Mushingantahe.
adult
who
exemplifies
Mushingantahe An
bushingantahe; a “wise man.”
the quality of being a good
Ubufasoni Dignity;
human.

336. This glossary is adapted from Nindorera, supra note 148, at 32.
Throughout academic literature on this subject, different authors refer to these
words differently. Most involve differences in spelling, such as using Batwa
where another author uses Twa, or Abashingantahe and Bashingantahe. I have
used the shorter labels for the sake of consistency. There is also confusion over
whether to interpret Bashingantahe to mean the people and the institution or
just the people, and whether to interpret bushingantahe as the name of the
institution or the set of values. I adopt the definitions above, as used by Ingelaere
& Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 48–49.

